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-A.N A-DDRESS 



— TO THl — 



Solliers i tlic Irmj of tiic Polmiiai; 



AND ESPSCIALLY TO THB 



mmm members of the fifth corps. 



CONTAININO A BBIBF REVIKW OF THB CASE OF 



Gen. FITZ JOHN PORTER. 




By one -who ^eryed under jim. 



n 



WASniNOTOK, D. c. : 

nomat McGill <f: Co., Printers, 1107 B Street yorthtoe$t. 

1880. 



"5 43 



WASHINGTON. D. C, July i, 1880. 

To my former Companions in Arms the survivors of the Fifth 
Corps, and to my fellow-soldiers of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

Comrades: The prominence which has of hitc been given to the 
case of Gen. Fitz John Porter, and the efforts put forth to secure a 
decision upon partisan grounds of the measure now pending before 
Congress for liis rehef, load me to address you in that friendly spirit 
which should ever govern the intercourse between men who have sliared 
hardships and dangers together. 

We may differ in politics — we may not agree as to tacts or conclu- 
sions in every respect — but there is one broad iilatlbrm upon which we 
xn'dy all stand — the platform of justice. In this belief I have conti- 
dence that you w ill give heed to my words a!id approve of what I shall 
say; or if you cuunot altogether approve, that you will accoid to me 
the credit of having spoken naught but the sincere convictions of an 
earnest heart. 

Gen. Fitz John Porter, who now seeks, as he has unceasing! v done 
in the past, reparation for a grievous wrong done him under color of 
law, was the iirst commander of the Fifth Corps. For the first two 
years of the late war the history of events in the field where the Arniy 
of the Potomac was contending with rebellion, was his history; and his 
history, I might almost say, was the history of the Union din'ing the 
same period. His loyalty, energy, and ability commended him to pub- 
lic notice at tiie very outbreak of hostilities, and his course during those 
early da3'8 of doubting did not belie the record he had previously made 
in Mexico. 

During the Peninsular campaign he came into yet greater promi- 
nence as the central figure of the siege of Yorktown and of the mem- 
orable "Seven Days" of battle from Mechanicsville to the James. 

We who fought under his leadership at Hanover, Mechanicsville, 
Gaines' Mill, the; Chickahominy, and Malvern had opportunity for 
judging not only of his capacity as a commander, but were also ena- 
bled to form some opinion as to what manner of man we had for a 
chieftain. We found him to be bold, sagacious, clear and far sighted, 
and proved him loyal to the very core of his great and sympathetic 
heart. 

He did not approve of the movement of the Army of the Potoma*- 
fi'om the Peninsula, nor did McCIellan, nor did Sumner, nor did Hoint- 
zelman, nor did the other generals — his brother-officers. They all saw 
the design of the rebel chieftain ; they all perceived, and many of them 
predicted, the change from the base of the James to the Potomac wouUl 
prolong the war, and even so it proved. It was a fatal mistake, in a 
military point of view, as subsequent events made plain. The war, 
which, had Gen. McDowell been permitted to join us after the battle 

(3) 



of Hanover Court-house, might have been ended in 18G2, was pro- 
tracted during three years of soitovv and bloody sweat. Thousands 
upon thousands of brave men w^ere sacrificed under Grant to secure 
the base of operations we had gained with comparatively small loss, 
and which we were compelled to abandon for want of proper support, 
from the government we were risking our lives in defending. 

The soil of the "Wilderness" of Virginia was enriched by the blood 
and shattered forms of thrice ten thousand heroes; the land was tilled 
with mourning, and an array of wounded and crippled veterans were 
sent to the rear to march up and down life's toilsome way until death 
should bid them rest, — and all because somebody blundered. 

The withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac let loose the combined 
rebel forces in Virginia upon the Union army in front of Washington, 
and when we arrived at Acquia Creek Pope was already enmeshed in 
a net principally of his own construction. 

Without having taken that first great precaution of a careful com- 
mander to protect his lines of supply, and in case of necessity for retreat, 
he was set upon by tlie enemy and hedged about upon every side by a 
wily foe. From the Rapidan to Manassas he was outgeneraled at 
every step, and when he arrived upon his old camping-ground he found 
himself in reality surrounded. The capital of the ]S'ation whose uni- 
form he wore was as inaccessible to his army, without risking almost 
certain overthrow, as though an ocean intervened. 

When he was in his greatest strait the Army of the Potomac came, 
and its skillful generals began retrieving the errors of Pope by finding 
the foe and holding him at bay. With the Potomac arniy came the 
Fifth Corps, under the command of Gen. Fitz John I^orter, and which, 
marching across the countiy from Acquia Creek by way of Kelly's 
Ford, was reported for duty to Gen. Pope at or near Warrenton Junc- 
tion on the 27th of August, 1862. A portion of the corps — the Penn- 
sylvania Reserves — had reported several days earlier. 

It is of our march from Warrenton to Groveton, and concerning 
the events occurring during the period extending from the 27th to the 
30th of August, inclusive, that I intend speaking; for upon the results 
of that march and upon those events depend the honor or dishonor of 
one for whom I then had, and for whom I yet entertain, the very highest 
regard. 

I shall endeavor to make my statements clear; and if I am somewhat 
tedious, I beg you to bear with me, remembering that the story I have 
to tell covers thousands of pages of printed records and testimony, 

I shall endeavor to state only facts as they were presented to my 
own observation, or appear of record; and if I err in any respect I 
hope to be corrected, for I would not knowingly do injustice to any 
one. 

At about 10 o'clock at night on the 27th August, Gen. Porter, then 
with his command at or near Warrenton Junction, received from Gen. 
Pope the following order : 

Headquakters Army of Virginia, 
Bristoe Station, August '21, 1802, 6.30 p. m. 

General: The mnjor-o-eneral comra:in(liiio^ din-ets tli;it you start at 1 o'cloc^k to- 
night, and come forward with your wliole corps, or sucli part of it as i.s witli you, so 



as to be here by dayliijlir; to-iuori'ow morniiiir. Hooker lias had a very sirvere actioij 
with the eiiiiiiiy, with a loss of about 300 Uiiicd ami woiiii(1<m1. The ciicuiy has beei> 
driven back, but is rctiriii;^ aloii;; Mie railroad. We innsr. drive; him from Manassas 
and clear tlie country between that place and Gainesville, wheie McDowell is. II 
Morell has not joined yon. send word to him to pnsli forward immediately. Also 
send word to Banks to hnrry forward with all speed lo take yonr i)lace at Warren- 
ton Jnnetl'Hi. It is necessary, on all aeconnts, that yon shonld i)e here by daylight. 
I send an officer with this dispatch who will conduct yon to this i)laee. IJe sure to 
send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayett.oville, probal)ly in tin- direction 
of Bi'aietoii. Say lo Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad trains to 
this sid<! of Cedar Kun. If he is not with you, write him to that eflect. 
Bv command of Major-General Pope : 

GEORGE D. KITGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of St;aff. 
Major-General F. .J. TOHTRR, 

Warrenton Jinictior.. 

P. S. — If Banks is not at Warrenton .Tnnction, leave a regiment of infantry anci 
two i>ieces of aiTillery as a guard till he comes up, with iustrnctions to follow yon 
hnmediat(dy. If Banks is not at the Jiuiction, instruct Colonel Cleary to run the 
trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery 
with it. 
Bv command of Major-General Pope: 

GEORGE D. RIIGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

This order was for Gen. Porter to inarch at 1 o'clock that night, and 
the object ot" the movement, as stated by Pope himself, was to driv^e the 
enemy, alleged to have been driven back and then retiring along the 
railroad, from Manassas, and clear the country of liini between that 
place and Gainesville, whore McDowell was supposed to be located. 

The order further required the Fifth Corps, or so much of it as was 
with Porter, to bo at Bristoe by dayliglit on the morning of the 28th. 

Those of us who marched from Falmouth via Kelly's Ford to War- 
renton, know full well the condition we were in on the night of the 
"27th, when the oi^der to march came. 

Himgry, weary, worn-out in fact by the last march of 19 miles in 
the heat and dust of a sultry midsummer day, we were illy ])repared 
for another 10-niile tramp, and at the cud of it bo in tit condition to 
meet the foe in shock of battle. But the duty of a soldier is supposed 
to know neither fatigue nor hunger; and hence we had scarcely biv- 
oaacked before we were ordered to make readj for the next move. 

The night was exceedingl}' dark. I remember it well. The roads 
were blocked and jammed with thousands of wagons — the trains of 
Pope's retreating army. 

The railroad was obstructed by passing trains of cars ar.d hy bridges 
over which an army could not well pass by daylight, much less at night, 
and everything tended to make a literal obedience to the order impos- 
sible. Besides, in addition to the physical obstructions to be encoun- 
tered, there was the knowledge — no mere passing belief, but a sound 
conviction founded upon various facts developed prior to the reception 
of the order — that Pope misunderstood the situation of affairs; that 
things were not as he represented them to be. Subsequent events 
proved the truth of this knowledge and of these convictions. 

The enemy had not been driven back, were not retreating in any di- 
rection, but, o!i the contrary, advancing to a new and stronger position 
almost exactly opposite from where Pope supposed him to be, and lay- 



ins: a trap for the major-general coninianding the Union forces, info 
which he was only too ready to fall. Gen. Porter nevertheless c.xi)rosse(l 
his desire to carry out the order sent him ; hut his division commanders, 
Morell, Sykes, arid Butteriield, all experienced soldiers and of approved 
ioyalty. counselled delay of a few hours, maintaining that nothing would 
])e lost, hut everything gained thereby. 

Gen. Porter, yielding" reluctantly to their advice, changed the hour 
for starting to 3 o'clock, and his troops began to move at tliat hour. 
Even then'the delays on account of darkness and the obstructions en- 
countered in the shape of wagon-trains, artillery, and the like, proved 
conclusively the wisdom of his subordinates. 

We reached Bristoe shortlv after 8 o'clock in the morning, and were 
all in line by 10 o'clock. We had marched 10 miles; and McDowell, 
Kearney, and Tleno, who had been ordered down to Bristoe and 
Manassas to help bag the rebel army, (at that time taking up jM^sition 
In the neighhorhood of Groveton.) and who had no obstructed roads 
to travel, "and the last two of whom had but five miles to come, did 
not reach the designated place sooner than we. 

And McDowell lost himself by the way and did not get up at all. 

They were ordered to march •• at the earliest blush of dawn," the 
order having been issued two and a half hours later than that to Gen. 
Porter. They had open roads and daylight all the way, and yet we all 
arrived, except McDowell, at about the same tune, we being ahead, if 
an\'thing. 

If the object in view was a combined movement against the enemy, 
what more could liave been required ? 

The movement proved unnecessary. In tact, the necessity ibr it had 
never existed at all. On his arrival Gen. Porter was informed ]:)y Pope 
that Ewell's division (the one to he bagged) had withdrawn in the night 
towards Manassas. Pope also stated that he intended starting with a 
portion of his force to '-beat up the enemy," (which was equivalent to 
an admission that his whereabouts were unknown.) and lelt about 11 
o'clock upon that undertaking. 

We all know how successful he was upon that expedition. Before 
nightfall he did "beat up the enemy" in a mauner and location feai- 
fully disastrous to himself 

It is worthy of note that Gen. Porter reported to Gen. Po[)e the 
chanGce in the hour for starting from Warrenton, and the reasons tliere- 
for, almost directly upon receipt of the order. 

No exception was taken to the modification, and I contend that, 
under the discretion vested in commanding officers of large bodies of 
troops, Gen. Porter did no more than he had a perfect right to do under 
the circumstances, and did right. 

And yet disobedience of this order was one of the charges bi-ought 
against Gen. Porter, and upon which he was tried. 

McDowell was not ijlamed for not obeying the order to him and fail- 
ing to get up at all — nor were Kearney and Reno censured because they 
were less diligent in obeying their orders, or because they failed to 
march live miles sooner than Porter marched ten. Porter was the only 
one upon whom the heavy hand of his chief's displeasure fell when Pope 



got it through his thick skull that, in order to save himself, some one 
must be sacrificed. 

The al'ternoon of the 28th found Pope hunting for the enemy in tin- 
vicinity of Centreville, where there was no enemy, and some of PopcV 
choicest troops being cut to pieces by the foe between Manassas and 
Groveton or Gainesville, where the commanding-general of the Unioi. 
forces insisted there was no foe. 

Pope's only anxiety seemed to be to got behind J3ull Run; hence \i'u 
desire to march to Centreville. Porter hit the nail on the head when Ik, 
remarked, in one of liis dispatches to Gen. Burnside, "• We are working 
now to get behind Bull Run, and I presume will be there in a few day&. 
if strategy don't use us up. The strategy is magniticent, and tactics in 
the inverse proportion." 

On the morning of the 29tli, after sunrise, Gen. Porter received the 
following order; 

IIeadquartkrs Army uk Virginia. 

Near Bull 1?un, Anr/ud 29, 1SG2, '3 a. m. 
General : McDowell iius interccpU'd tlio n^ncut of Jackson. Siijei is injmcdiatt'ly 
on the ric'lit of Mt-Dowell. lv<>arii('v iinil llooUcr marcli to attack the enemy's reur 
at early dawn. Major-General Pope directs j-on to iiu)ve npon Centreville at the 
first dawn of day witli your wliole command, leaving your trains to follow. It ik 
very important that yon slionld bo here at a very early liour in the morning. A 
severe engagement is likely to take place, and yonr presence is necessary. 
I am, General, very rcspectfullv, your obedient servant, 

GEORGE D. KUGGLES. 

Colonel and Cliief of SlatT. 
Major-General Porter. 

From this order it appeared that Gen. McDowell, who liad mysteri- 
ously lost himself the day previous, had been found again, and was at 
that moment intercepting the retreat of the rebel Jackson. 

The order is dated near Bull Run, (that seemed l^ope's hobby,) and 
the rear of the enemy was to be attacked at early dawn. Porter was 
to move upon Centreville at the iirst dawn of day, &c., &c. 

i^o wonder Gen, Porter was surprised upon receipt of such an order. 
So would any one have been, knowing, as he did, that the enemy were 
in an entirely different direction. The order carried him directly away 
from the field of action with all his troops, and he knew it. 

Gen. Pope might have made himself aware t)f the same facts h:id hv 
but chosen to avail himself of the means at hand and exercise a littL- 
foresight and common sense. Jackson was expecting Longstreet anx- 
iously, eagerlj', — needed his assistance, — and was not apt to make a 
movement calculated to take him farther and farther away from th< 
coming relief. Instead of going to Centreville he would naturally, i' 
not from necessity, have gone in the direction of Groveton or Gaines- 
ville. Thus a private soldier would have reasoned, but not so Pope. 

At Manassas Junction Gens. Porter and McDowell met. They dif-- 
cussed the situation, and each learned from the other the facts witliit; 
his knowledge. It appears from their respective statements that both 
were equally surprised at the rapidly succeeding and contradictory 
orders of their superior officer. 

Neither of them (^ould understand from the dispatches directed to 
them the objects of the movements they were required to make, and 



officers placed in their situations, to act intelligently necessarily required 
such information. Gen. Porter, while carrying out the order above 
given, had received repeated messages to hasten to Oentreville, where 
a great battle was expected, posting a force at Bull Euii bv the way. 
Gen. McDowell, the day before, (the 28th,) had been ordered, first, to 
march with his whole force to Manassas; second, to march upon Oen- 
treville ; third, to march upon Gum Spring, the enemy being, as was 
probably known to every one hut Pope, between Gainesville and 
Grovetou. 

Porter, as I have stated, was, at the time of his meeting with Gen. 
McDowell, on his way to Oentreville, in obedience to Gen, Pope's order 
of 3 A. M. of the 29th. Some of his troops had already passed Manassas 
Junction when he received a new order, first verbal, afterwai'ds in 
writing, as follows: 

HlCADQUARTERS ABMY OF VIRGINIA, 

Oentreville, August 29. 1862. 
Push forwiiid witii your corps and King's division, whicii you will t:ilce with 
you, upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warronton turnpike. 
Be expeditious, or we will lose much. JOIIX POPE. 

Major-Genenil Conjuianding. 

Pope had evidently given up the idea of finding the enemy at Oen- 
treville; in fact, had doubtless had some glimmer of the truth beaten 
into his brain by the pounding of cannon in the direction of Gaines- 
ville, and hence sought to interpose a large force near that point be- 
tween Jackson, whom he had reason to suppose was there, and Long- 
street, who was coming or had come through Thoroughfare Gap with 
his wing of the rebel army. 

It is proper here to mention the fact that Gens, liicketts and King, 
with a combined force of some 17,000 men, had been sent to the Gap 
to hold Longstreet in check, but had, without, or rather in violation 
of orders, withdrawn their commands on the ai'ternoon or night of the 
28th, and this without any effort on their part to obstruct Longsl reefs 
advance. 

The way thus left open, the rebels came through the pass the same 
night it was vacated by the Union troops, as above stated, and during 
the morning of the 29th, and were well on their roulse to reinforce 
Jackson in the vicinity of Groveton at about the time Pope was hunt- 
ing for the last named in the direction of Oentreville-. 

The situation, so far as it concerns this narrative, was, upon the morn- 
ing of August 29, when Porter received the order to march upon 
Gainesville and take King with him, aljout as follows: King, with 
9,000 men, was at Manassas Junction ; F:*orter was also there, a portion 
of his troops having passed that point on the way to Oentreville. 

Longstreet had passed through Thoroughfare Gap, his army extend- 
ing from a little south of the Manassas Gap Railroad in a northerly or 
northeasterly direction toward Groveton, where the right of Jackson 
rested. Jackson occupied a line extending from near Groveton to the 
vicinity of Sudley's Springs. 

Sigel and Rej'nolds were confronting Jackson near Groveton ; Heint- 
zelman an(i Reno were moving up from Oentreville to their support, 



9 

aiKl Ricketts was on tho road falling hack IVoni Gainesville to Manassas 
Junction by way of Bristoe. 

Buford, with his cavalry, who had been to Thoroughfare Gap with 
Ricketts, was on the same road near Gainesville watching Longstreet. 
Pope himself was at Centreville, six miles from Manassas Junction. 

The distance from Manassas Junction to Gainesville is eight miles, 
and from Gainesville to Thoroughfare Gap six miles. 

Longstrcct's force was about "25,000 strong; that of Porter (Morell. 
Sjkes, and King) about 17,000. 

A portion of Longstreet's command — seventeen regiments, one bat- 
tery, and five hundred cavalry — had passed through Gainesville before 
9 o'clock of the 29th, as was reported by Gen. Buford, thus showing 
that a considerable force of the enemy had alread}' anticipated Pope 
in liis occupation of that position. 

On i-eceipt of the verbal order to move on Gainesville, Gen. Porter 
set his troops in motion, Morell's division leading, and met Longstreet's 
advance about 11 or 11-J o'clock a mile and a half or two miles in a 
westerly direction from Bethlehem church and some six oi* seven miles 
from Alanassas Junction. 

Morell inmiediately formed his division along the course of a small 
stream (Dawkin's Branch) on the southerly side of the Manassas Gap 
Railroad, his line occupying the east side of a small valley and com- 
manding the opposite slope. On the left the valley was open, debouch- 
ing into a cleared country, but upon the other sides it was surrounded 
by timber and a thick growth of brush-wood. 

The regiment to which I had the honor to belong [13th K". Y. Vols.. 
1st Biig., 1st (Morell's) Div.] was deployed as skirmishers as early as 
12 o'clock, and advanced across the valley, passing over Dawkin's 
Branch and nearly up to the timber crowning the slope opposite to that 
upon whicli our troops were deployed. In the meantime a section of 
artillery had been run up by the rebels upon an eminence slightly to 
our right, near Carrico's house, and opened fire. 

These guns were soon silenced by one of our own batteries, but sub- 
sequently they or some others were again opened on us farther to our 
right. 

From our advanced position as skirmishers we were easily able to 
determine that we had in our immediate front a considerable force oi' 
the enemy; and Porter, knowing Longstreet to have passed the Gmji, 
knowing that a large force of rebels had passed through Gainesville as 
early as SI- or 9 o'clock that morning, at once; judged the foe opposed 
to us to be a part of Longstreet's command. 

The enemies of Gen. Porter have endeavored to secure credit for tho 
story started by them that the only force we had in our front consisted 
of a few cavalrymen galloping up and down and a number of mules 
dragging brush along the roads to cause a dust. The falsity of that, 
story is known to every man who was under Porter that day and who 
was in the vicinity of Dawkin's Branch. We had seen too much ser- 
vice on the Peninsula not to l)e able to distinguish between a regi- 
ment of itifajitry and I)rush heaps, or between the galloping of a few 
cavalry and the rumble of army wagons and artillery supplemented by 



10 

(he tramp of arincd men. i3esides, we had ocular demonstration of 
the fact that the enemy were before us in force — we saw them. 

It was abont this time (noon of the 29th) when Gen. Porter received 
wljat is known as the "joint order" to himself and McDowell, and 
which is as follows: 

HEADQUAKTERS AllJIY OF ViRGIXIA, 

Centkkville. Aitfjiist 29, 18G'2. 
[Goneral Onlor Xo. 5.] 

r,..iu;iiils McDowelIj and Porter. 

Yon will please iiKive forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I 
sent Gen. Poi'ter written orders to that olVeet an lionr and a lialf aj;o. lleintzel- 
inan, 8iir«l, and Keno are movin,;^: on the Warrenton tm-npike, and must now be 
not far from Gainesville. T desire that, as soon as eoinmnnication is established 
betwecui this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be neces- 
sary to fall back bt^hind" Bull Hun, at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be so, 
on accoinit of our supplies. I have sent no orders oE any description toRlcketts, 
:ind none to interfere in any way with the mov(MTients of McDowell's troops, except 
what I sent by his aid-de-camii last night, which were to hold his position on the 
Warrenton pike nntil the troo))S from here siionld fall upon the enemy's tlank and 
rear. I do not evi-n know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to Ihid out 
where Gen. McDowell was nntil a late hour this morning. Gen. McDowell will take 
immediate steps to comnnmieate with Gen. Ricketts. and instruct him to n^join the 
*)tiier divisions of his corps as .soon as pnicticable. If any considerable ;idvantages 
ire to be gained by departing from tiil^ order it will not be strictly can-ied out. One 
thing nnist be held in viiiw, that the troops must occnpy a position from wiiich they 
can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that th(; whole 
force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here 
by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters will be for the present witli 
lieinlzidnKin's corps '^'' at this place. 

jonx POPE, 

Major-General (commanding. 

This order, like some of those which had preceded it, showed that Pope 
was determined to lie upon the safe side of Bull Run in the event of a 
retreat becoming necessary. It was dated at Centreville, twelve or 
fourteen miles from Gainesville, as far away from the scene of action 
as possible without tixinsf upon its author the charge of cowardice. 

When the order was received McDowell and Porter were too;ethor, 
and the former being the ranking oliicer, at once assumed conmiand of 
Iho Joint forces of Porter and King. 

He at the same tiiTie informed Porter of Bulbrd's report, already re- 
lVnx'<l to, concerning the passage of rebel troops through Gainesville. 

This information confirmed Porter's previous knowledge of Long- 
streei's movements, and satisfied him that it was the corps of that gen-> 
eral now opposed to him. 

It is to 1)6 o'oserved that the "joint order" required Porter and Mc- 
]';owell to move forward with their commands towards GainesviUe, 
estal)h.sh coniiiiunication with Hcintzclmau. Sigel, and Reno, then — 
hiilt. 

Ft is also to be ol^served that 8.000 men — a small army — were knock- 
i!>g about the country soniewhei'e under Gen. Ricketts, (at what point 
or in wliat direction Pope did not know,) and that for some time pre- 
vious the whereabouts of Gen. McDowell himself had been unknown 
to the leader whose "headquarters" were "in the saddle," and who 
should have kept his men in view, even though compelled now and 
then to lose .sight of a sceneral. 



11 

Commeut upon such generalship as that displayed by Pope, as shown 
by hi(5 own admissions, is unnecessary, and would be an impertinence 
to the undei'standiiig of the commonest soldier in the ranks. 

The '-joint order" was directed to McDowell as well as Porter, and, 
if anything, was more imperative upon the former, as he was the rank- 
iiig othcer. But McDowell saw proper to disobey the order, or to in- 
terpret it in a manner to suit himself; and hence,"after having directed 
a disposition of Porter's immediate command, withdrew, taking King 
and his 9,000 men with him. 

This withdrawal left ]\)rter in command of his two divisions, (Mor- 
oll's and Sykes'.) aggregating some 8,000 or 9,000 men, and devolved 
upon him the necessity (^f exercising his own judgment and discretion 
in further carrying out the order. One thing he was compelled to bear 
in mind, viz.: that he must hold himself in readiness to fall back behind 
Bull Pun by that night or next morning; Bull Run and Ccntrevillc 
evidently being Pope's strong points — hh forte, if he had any. 

After McDowell left. Gen. I'orter contiiuied making his dispositions 
for attack, and sent word to Gen. King not to leave." Then came the 
following message from Gen. McDowell: 

••Give my coniplinK'Ufs to Gcii. Porter, ami s;iy I nm i^oinnr to tlio y]^ht ami sliall 
t;iki' Ki'ii: with mr. XL- [Pori.'i] had bi'ttcr remain wliorc he is, but if necessary to 
f:ill h.H'k, lie can do so on tuy left.'' 

This message was in all respects equivalent to an order. McDow(>ll, 
the ranking otiicer, had abrogated the joint order by withdrawing him- 
self and half of the joint command ; and what else could Gen. Porter do 
besides using his own judgment in disposing of his own command, and 
conforming to the plan adopted by AlcDowell in withdrawing King 
and promising to put him on Porter's right, and thereby to complete 
the connections enjoined in the order? 

McDcnvell's withdrawal set another considerable fragment of the 
Union army floating around loose until evening, and, jxiraphrasing u 
well-known saying, "[)ut it where it would do the least good." 

Gen. Porter's force being thus depleted, he, as a wise and experi- 
enced general, exercising the discretion vested in him when McDowell 
withdrew, (and by the "joint order" itself for that matter,) resolved to 
stand u[»on the defensive until ordered to do otherwise, or circum- 
stances made a change necessary or desirable. He knew he had a 
large force of the enemy in his front (Longstreet's corps), and knew 
that to attack 25,000 with otie-third that number would but court the 
disaster of defeat sure to follow. 

I repeat. Porter fmeio the situation. In was no mere guess-work with 
him, as with Pope. He understood the situation and adopted the 
wisest and only proper coui'se under the circumstances. The force in 
his front prevented Porter from marching toward Groveton except i)V 
retracing his steps — falling back, as did McDowell — and he couKl not, 
therefore, form a junction with Sigel, Reno, and Ileintzelnum, that 
duty having been assumed by McDowell ; but at the same time his 
presence was a menace to the rebels, and kept Longstreet from uniting 
with Jackson. In i;w't.. Porter's generalship delayed for a day the deie:il 
of Pope's army l>y holding thi' reinforcements of the enemy in clieck. 



12 

Yet Porter is censured for his conduct on that day, the 29th of Au- 
gust. One of the charges made against him h}' Pope was, that he dis- 
obeyed the "joint order" to him and McDowell. 

All I have to say upon tliis point is, that if anybody disobeyed that 
oi'der it was McDowell, not Porter, and the roppcctive movements of 
the two commanders establish that fact. As proot of Gen. I\)rtcr's 
wish to carry out the order of Gen. Pope, I will give one dispatch 
which the former sent to the commander of his ni-sl division after the 
departure of McDowell : 

"Gen. ^roRKIjL : Piisli over to tli(- aid of Sigel and strike in Iiis real-. If ym! 
reach a road up whicli King is movini;^, and lu' lias oot aiiead of yon, let liini pass. 
l)nt see if yon cannot u^ive help to Sigcl. If yon find him retiring, move baeli to- 
wtirds Manassas, and siionid necessity reqnii-e it, and yon do not hear from me. pnsh 
to Centreville. If yon find the direct road filled, take the one via Union Mills, which 
is to the right as yon letnrii. F. J. PORTER, Major-Geneial. 

"Look to the points of the compass for Manassas. F. J. PORTER.'" 

This order is of itself sufficient to relieve Gen. Porter of any charge 
of willful disobedience, and when the force of the enemy in his front is 
considered, he is deserving of commendation rather than blame for his 
.on duct. 

Tliat he did not succeed in opening communication with Sigel was 
?io fault of his, but was attributable to the conformation of the country 
and other physical obstructions, and to the fact that Longstrcet with 
iiis army presented an obstacle too serious to be overcome by the troops 
at Porter's command, and just at that time (when the order was given) 
was threatening an attack upon him. 

I now come to consider the famous 4.30 p. m. order, of which much 
has been said, and for the alleged disobedience of which Gen. Porter 
has been most strongly condemned. 

As already stated, after McDowell withdrew, taking King's division 
with him. Porter remained with his troops in position confronting 
Longstreet, his skirmishers beinoj continuallv eno;a2:ed in feelin<r and 
pressing the enemy. 

McDowell was kept informed, so far as practicable, of the condition 
of affairs, and in the afternoon Gen. Porter sent word to Gen. Popc' 
asking for infortnation and orders, informing liirn at the same time 
that Morell would soon be engaged. 

About 6 o'clock, information having been received from the viglu. 
wing that the enemy were retreating up the Warrenton pike. Gen. 
I'orter ordered an attack, which Gen. ^lorcll began to execute, but at 
the same time expressing the conviction that the order, it" carried out, 
would result disastrously, the enemy being so strong in his tVont and 
showing no signs of retreating or abandoning their position, but, on the 
contrary, were strengthening it. 

The following is the order of Gen. Porter above referred to : 

■'Gen. Morell : I wish yon to pnsli np two regiments, snpponed l)y two others, 
preceded by skirmishers, the regiments at intervals of two hnndred yards, antl ntlack 
the party with the si-ction of a rtillerj' opposed to .yon. The battle looks well on onr 
right, r.nd the enemy are saiil to be retiring np the pike. Give tlie ei'.emy a :;')(>. I 
shelling when onr troops advance. ' F. J. POR'l'EH, Major-Geiieral." 

This order was issued by Gen. Porter on receipt by liim of a i-cr)ort 
that the en'^my were retreating, and which, if true, showed that the 



13 

Itiittlo was looking well on the ri2;ht, or, in other words, that Sigel 
and his supports were driving the rehels up the Warrenton pike past 
Morel I's [)()sitioii. 

A. personal examination of the situation by Gen. Porter shortly after 
he issued the order to advance contirmed ^lorell's statements as to the 
danger and bad policy of a forward movement. He became fully 
;;atistied that the enemy were not retreating, as had been reported to 
him, and, therefore, in view of the nearness of night (it was then about 

o'clock) and of the facts above stated, he issued the following order 

placing the troops in position for the night : 

•'Gen. Morell : Pcit 3-om- iik-ii in position to irmuin dnriiii; tiic nifiht, .and 
liav(! () it. yoiu- [tickets. Put thcni so tli.'it tlu-y will bo in position to resist anything. 

1 am about a mile from you. jMcDowoH says all goes well and we are getling the 
best of the tight. I wish yon would send ine a dozen men from the cavalry. Keep 
me. informed. 'rroo[)S arc passing up to Gainesville, pushinii' the eiieniv; Ricketts 
has gone, also King. F. J. PORTER, Major-General." 

There is not a word in the above order that even hints at a retreat. 
On the contrary, it conveys the impression by its very language that 
i'orter intended to remain there until forcibly driven back or ordered 
away by his superior officer. He had been sent to stay, and intended 
doing so, as his order to Morel I clearly indicated. 

We on the skirmish line did not fall back at all, but picketed the 
front until we marched the next morning. The rest of our force lay 
within easy supporting distance upon the high ground to our rear. 
Porter himself was on the field only a short distance from Morell, and 
thus matters were when Lieut. Weld, whom he had dispatched to Gen. 
Pope, returned. 

This was between sundown and dark, or, to be more precise, a httlo 
after tl o'clock P. M. 

Lieut. AVeld, as he informed Gen. Porter, had delivered the note to 
Gen. I\)pe near Grovetou, but brought back no commands and but 
little information. 

After his return, however. Gen. Porter received the following: 

Headquarters in the Field, 

Avgnst^2^, 186-2— 4:;{0 p. u. 
Tour line of march brings you in on the enemy's flunk. I desire you to push for- 
ward into action at once on the enemy's right flank, and, if i)0ssible, on his rear, 
keeping vonr right in connuiuru'ation with Gen. Reynolds. Tlie enemy is mas.sed 
in the "voi, (Is in front of us, but he can be shelled out as soon as you engage their 
tlank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right 
all the time. In case yon are obliged to fall back, do so to 3'onr right an<l rear, so 
a< to keeii von in close connnuni^ation with the right wing. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-General Comniai-.din'^. 
Major-Geiieral PoRTER. 

This is the 4.30 p. 31. order upon which so much stress is laid by Pope 
and his adherents, and it is for the alleged disobedience of this order, 
more than any other, that the hand of public censure has been most 
heavily laid upon him to whom it was directed. 

There are two questions involved in the consideration of this order, 
viz.: 1st. The exact time of its reception by Gen. Porter; 2d. The ex- 
act situittion of affairs at the time it was received. 

And lirst, as to the date of its reception : Pope insists it must have been 



14 

delivered to Gen. Porter between 5 and half-piist 5 in the ai'ternooti. 
basing his behef upon the hour of its date and tlie etatenicnt of the 
person who carried it. Porter alleges that he received it after G.30 p. m. 

I believe the time fixed by Gen. Porter to be correct, and for the 
following reasons: 

1st. llie person who carried the note did not look at his watch or 
tinje himself, and in the then condition of the roads, blocked up as they 
were liy moving bodies of troops, the messenger was more apt to be 
detained by the way, and, besides, he was not familiar with the country, 
and, judging from his testimony, could hardly have proceeded in any- 
thing like a direct course. 

2d. It is clearly established that the order had not been received by 
Gen. Porter up to the hour of the return of his aid from Gen. l\)[)e, 
which was after 6 o'clock. 

3d. I remember distinctly the movements made about o'clock, 
when Gen. Porter oi'dered \lorell to advance and attack the enemy, 
anfl it was nearly dark when orders came for us to resume position for 
the night. It was after sundown. 

4th. I remember also of having heard, while at the front, as soldic're 
will hear such news, that there had been or was to bo another order 
for attack, but then it was already dusk and night close at hand. This 
rumor must have reached us on receipt by Porter of the 4.30 order; 
and as Gen. Locke was inmiediately dispatched to Gen. Morell uith 
instructions to attack, the natural conclusion is that we got the news on 
the picket line within a few minutes, as there was constant coiumuiii- 
cation between us and the main body. 

The most important evidence, however, showing the hour when (len. 
Porter received the 4.30 i*. m. order, is this: 

Gen. Porter, upon receiving it, and after having ordered Morel I lo 
attack with his whole torce, acknowledged its receipt in writing, sub- 
stantially stating that although he thought the order had arrived too 
late to be executed, he would do all that was possible to carry it into 
effect, &c. 

Gen. Porter also stated in the acknowlexh/nient of Gen. Pope's order, or 
upon the envelope containing it, the exact hoar when he had received the one 
sent him. 

This communication frorii Gqw. Porter, although Pope admits haxing 
received it, or one substantially as set out, has never been produced^ 
although Gen. Porter has earnestly sought l)y every means in his power 
to bring it to light. 

This brief note would confirm the guilt of Gen. Porter, iixing upon 
him a lasting stain of dishoiior and disgrace, or it would establish his 
innocence beyond the shadow of a doubt. Why has Gen. Pope with- 
held it ? Of all the voluminous correspondence between him and Gen. 
Porter during the memorable last three days of August, this, the most 
important of all to the cause of justice, alone is missing. Th*e conclu- 
sion is irresistible that Pope has either willlully destroyed or kept it 
back; and if such be the case, the only reason that can be assigned for 
his so doing is that it would prove himself a liar and Porter a deeply- 
injured person — injured through his instrumentality. And in the 



15 

absence ot" that little scrap of paper, or some more reasonable excnse for 
its non-production than has yet been given, the unanimous verdict of 
nil jnst-ininded persons must be tbat its production would be Porter's 
justiiication ; and Justitication for Porter means condemnation for Pope. 

From the facts coming personally to my knowledge, and after a full 
and careful examination of all the testimony, I am thoroughly con- 
vinced that the 4,30 P. m. order was not received until too late to be 
executed, and that Gen. Porter's failure to attack was through no fault 
or disobedience on his part. 

The second important question to be considered is the situation — the 
positions of the troops of both armies at the time when the 4.30 p. m. 
order was issued by Pope, and subsequently when received by Porter. 

The order says : 

"Your line of march brings yon in on tJie enemy's flank. I desire you to push 
forward into action at once on tiie enemy's right flank^ and, if possible, on his rear, 
keepinij; yonr risht in communication with Gen. Reynolds. The enemy is massed 
in the woods in front of us, but he can he shelled out as soon as you engage theh* 
flank." 

At the time Gen. Pope wrote the above order, Longstreet's right 
extended vso far around as to almost envelop Porter's left flank, and 
J jongstreet's left was within easy supporting distance of Jackson's right 
wing, which wo were expected to attack. The gap between the two 
wings of the rebel army was held by cavalry and artillery. 

And the above had l)een the situation since 12 o'clock in the day. 

Porter's line of march, instead of bringing him in on the enemy's 
(.lackson's) right flank, led him against the right centre of Longstreet's 
25,000, drawn up in line of battle across our front. 

Pope's order presumed: 1st. That Longstreet had not arrived ; 2d. 
That Porter was at least a mile and a half in advance of the position 
he really occupied. 

Both of these presumptions were erroneous, and clearly showed that 
Pope either had no knowledge of the exact situation, or that he was 
not possessed of sufflcient sense to be governed by it. 

Indeed, it is now a matter of history that he assigned to Porter a 
pOvsition that day which, at the time, was actually occupied by Long- 
street's line of battle. Such ignorance or stupidity, or both, on the part 
of the commander of 60,000 soldiers, is wholly inexcusable. 

Between Porter's right and the left of Reynolds was a gap of some 
two miles, the obstacles lying lietween consisting of heavy forests and 
a rough country, diliicnlt to pass over for want of roads. 

To" have united with Keynolds, Porter must have marched back on 
the route taken by McDowell earlier in the day; and had he done this 
he might have laid himself open to the charge of retreating in the face 
of the enemy, which Pope makes against him. 

Had l\)rter not been hampered by the foe in his immediate front, 
the movement mifjht have been made; but as matters were it was im- 
possible. Besides, had not McDowell started oft' with 9,000 men osten- 
>.ibly to till the gap between Porter, remaining where he was ordered 
to sta}', and Reynolds ? 

Porter could not have withdrawn without bringing on an engage- 



16 

ment disastrous to the Union arms. His 9,000 men, moving to the 
rear, could not possible have withstood the onslaught of Ijongstreet's 
25,000. 

Porter could not have struck Jackson's rear, nor even his right 
flank, because to have done so he must have tirst overcome Longstreet, 
who protected it. 

Pope, however, claimed then, and yet asserts, that there was no con- 
siderable force of the enemy in Porter's front that day, which only 
goes to show that a person may wear the uniform of a general and yet 
be a fool. 

Porter maintained at the time that Pope entirely misunderstood 
the situation ; and the evidence on his court-martial, which ^yas suffi- 
cient to convince any but the most pig-headed that he was right, has 
since been amply confirmed by testimony not then accessible. I^ong- 
street, (a good republican now,) Wilcox, Hood, Ewcll, and other prom- 
inent rebel officers, must certainly know what positions tliey occLii»ied 
on the 20th of August, and they sustain Porter in every essential i>ur- 
ticular. 

And that the enemy were in force in Porter's immediate vicinity, is 
amply shown by the testimony of his own officers and that of Gen. 
Buford, who had reported 17 regiments of rebel infantry, a battery, 
and 500 cavalry as passing through Gainesville before 9 o'clock in the 
morning; and these were some of Longstreet's men. 

AH these facts were known to Porter when he received the 4.30 p. 
M. order, and had been in his possession for hours previous ; hence, 
while endeavoring to carry out faithfully the orders of Pope, he was 
obliged, as a careful commander, to consider things as they actually 
existed, instead of as the}' were supposed to be by one who was miles 
away and had no personal knowledge of the situation. 

Porter was right ; and for holding the foe in check, as he did, deserves 
praise, instead of the opprobrium sought to be cast upon him by his 
accusers. 

But Pope insists on another statement, viz. : That there was a heavy 
battle progressing diu'ing the entire day of the 29th, and that Porter, 
instead of going to the assistance of his brethren in the licld, marched 
to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon. 

Comrades, this is a serious 'charge to make against an officer, but it 
becomes much more serious when one reflects that it casts the stain of 
cowardice or disloyalty upon a whole corps. We who were under Por- 
ter knew him to be brave and true ; but yet we would not have per- 
mitted even him to stand idly by while our brothers in arms were being 
slauglitered and we within reaching distance. 

And especially would we have put forth every effort to aid our breth- 
ren (if any stronger incentive than duty were needed) when, as in the 
instance referred to, they were a part of ourselves. The gallant Rey- 
nolds was Porter's friend, and he and his veteran heroes of the Penn- 
sylvania Jleserves belonged to the Fifth Corps. Think you, comrades, 
that it is }irobable — nay, is it possible — that we stood idly by while they. 
the men who did so bravely and succored us so gallantly in the flerce 
engagements upon the Peflinsula, were being sacrificed? No; you 



17 

do not, — you cannot think us guilty of such a crime. And wc were 
not. 

We did not retreat to the sound of the enemy's cannon, hecause, as 
I have ah'cady shown, there was no falling back on our part. I, on the 
skirmish line, occupied the same position when darkness set in that I 
did at 12 o'clock in the day and subsequently, or, it anything, was more 
advanced. 

We did not fail or refuse to go to the assistance of comrades engaged 
in a heavy battle, because there was no heavy battle in our vicinity 
during the time specified. We heard the sounds of artillery firing, as 
we had heard them for a week previous; and occasionally we could 
hear little spurts of musketry, both in our own front and from our own 
skirmishers, and off on the right toward Groveton ; but there were 
none of the sounds of a battle came to our oars that day till just at 
dark. 

Gen. lieynolds, who was two miles further to our right and that much 
nearer the alleged scene of conflict, testified that he heard no sounds 
of a battle. 80 did others. Who shall be believed, the peerless soldier 
Reynolds or the braggart Pope? 

Just at nightfall — between, I should judge, 6 and 7 o'clock — there was 
a sharp but short engagement otl" some distance on our right. 

We could distinctly hear the volleys of musketry and cheers of the 
opposing forces. 

That engagement was brought on between Gen. ITatch and the ene- 
my by McDowell's order to advance, on the supposition that the rebels 
were in full retreat. 

Hatch moved ahead, and, instead of finding the enemy retreating, 
found them advancing. McDowell persisted in his first statement, that 
they were falling back, but his illusion soon disappeared wheti Hatch, 
with the loss of nearly half his men, \vas compelled to retire from a 
su[)ertor foe. 

At the time of the above-mentioned engagement we were some con- 
siderable distance away, with a wary antagonist in our front. The tighi 
was over long before we could have marched half-way to where it 
occurred, had we been able to have gotten rid of Longstreet. Porter 
did the only thing under the circumstances proper for him to have 
done — held to the enemy in his front — and thereby kept reinforcements 
from going to the aid of »Tackson. 

Regarding the above occurrences, I believe that I liave only to ap- 
peal to my comrades of the Fifth Corps, and who were with me there 
and then, to show that I have not misstated the facts. 

I now pass on to the events of the next day. Early on the morning 
of the 30th (about 3 o'clock) Gen. Porter received an order to march 
to the vicinit}' of Groveton, and reported to Gen. Pope soon after sun- 
rise near the crossing of the Warrenton pike by the Sudley Spring 
road. 

Old soldiers will remember the locality distinctly by the *' Old Stone 
House" standing at the junction. 

On the march, in the darkness and through some misunderstanding, 
but no fault of Gen. Porter's, GrifUn's brigade and some 1,100 men 
2 



18 

under Gen. Pialt, (the latter only temporarily attached to Porter's com- 
mand,) became separated, marching to Pope's great strategic point — 
Centreville — instead of turning at Bethlehem Church and marching to 
Groveton. 

Thus Porter was able to report with only G.OOO troops for duty, 

I shall never forget the magnificent panorama — magnificent but at 
the same time terrible — that burst upon my sight as I reached the high 
ground south of the Warrcnton pike, on my way to the battle-held of 
the 30th of August, 1862. 

You who were with me remember it; and now, as you read, there 
rises up before you a vision like this: Below you, winding sluggishly 
along on its way to Bull Eun, a small stream; just beyond, parallel 
with its course and crossing the Sudley Spring road, in which you stand, 
at right angles, the Warrcnton pike. Beyond this, and to your left a 
mile or little less, a cluster of buildings, or Groveton ; and then, stretch- 
ing from those buildings far around to the right and across 3'our path, 
you behold a high, rolling, open plateau bounded on the farther side 
by a ridge dotted with cannon. 

Beyond this ridge, about midway between Groveton and the Sudley 
Springs road running on straight before you, are seen the roofs and 
chimneys of Mrs. Dogan's house. 

To the right of the Sudley Springs road, embowered in an orchard 
interspersed with a few forest trees crowning a loft}' eminence, you see 
rising up the lonely chimneys of the Henry House — fitting monuments 
of the iii'st battle of Manassas. 

Here and there the prospect is varied and its beauty enhanced by 
solitary trees, or small clusters of them, lifting their leafy crowns in 
air, while life is given to the picture by moving columns of Idue coats, 
glancing bayonets, galloping horsemen, and all the pomp and panoply 
of active warfare. 

From the cannon on the crest beyond are shooting out sheets of 
tlame and curling wreaths of vapory smoke; and yet farther away, just 
in front of the heavy timber whose lofty tops here and there show al)0ve 
the embattled heights of Groveton, are other guns from which the bolts 
of death come flying over the marching columns, bursting high in the 
air or falling down, mayhap, at your very feet. 

Over all this inspiring and pulse-thrilling spectacle bends heaven's 
blue canopy, flecked with light fleecy clouds, through which the golden, 
Ijurniug rays of a midsummer's sun fall gently down, shimmering 
through the foliage of the trees, glancing lightly upon the rippling 
waters and gleaming with a feverish, fitful light upon the weapons of 
friends and foemen. 

You remember, my comrades of the Fifth Corps, how we marched 
down into the valley, across the stream — some of us stopping to fiJl our 
canteens by the way — and up the opposite slope beneath the dropping 
shells from the enemy's guns. 

You remember when we reached the line of our artillery. You can 
each doubtless see even now in your mind's eye our line of battle cross- 
ing the Warrenton pike in the vicinity of Groveton on the left, and 



19 

extending around in an irregular semicircle to the right until it crossed 
the Sudlcy Springs road. 

If you do remember, I ask you to follow me closely as I attempt to 
describe what subsequently transpired, as I remember the events and as 
history has recorded them. 

About 12 o'clock Gen. Pope issued the following order: 

Hkadquartkiis near Groveton, 

Aurfust 30. 1802, VI M. 
[Special OrtU'r No. — .] 
The following forces will be immediately tlii-owii forward in. jmrsuit of the enemy . 
and uress him viii^oroiisly duriii:^' tin', wiioic; day : 

Major-Crcnerai McDowell is as<i;>-iie(l to the command of the pursuit ; Major-General 
PorLcr's i-or[)S will push forward on the Warreiitou turnpike, followed by tiie divis- 
ions of ]Jrii;adier-Generals Kiiit;- and Reynolds. 

Th<i division of ]Jrij;adier-G<'neral Kioketts will purine the llaymarket road, fol- 
lowed b}' the eorp.s of Major-Gcneral Ileintzelman. The necessary cavalry will Iv 
assij,'ned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom n!<;ular"aud fre- 
quent reports will bo made. 

The ijeneral headquarters will be somewhere on the Warreiiton turnpike. 
Bv command of Major-General Pope : 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
Col. and Ciiief of Staff. 

And Gen. McDowell the following: 

Headquarters 3d Corps, Army of Virginia, 

August 30, 18G2. 
Major-General McDowell beinu; ehari,'ed witli the advanced forces ordered in pur- 
sue the enemj/, (.Wvectn uie to inform you tl)atyoiu' corps will be followed immediately 
by Kini>-'s division, supported i>y Reynolds. Ileiiilzelman, wiili his co;ps. iireceded 
by Ricketts' division, will move nn your riii^lit, on the road frum Sndley Spiinus to 
Haymarket. lie is instructed to I brow out ski-mi-heis to tiie left, wiiicli if is desir- 
able you should join with your ri^iit. General ^leDowell's head(piarters will be at 
_the head of Reynolds' division, on the Warreuton road. Ori;;ani7A! a strou2; advauc*^ 
to prei-ede your command, and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enenij' until 3'ou 
coiui! in (!outact with him. R -poi'i freqnenlly. Hayard's i>n;;adc will be ordered to 
report to you. Push it w(dl to I he left as you advance. 
Very respectfullv, your obedient servant. 

ED. SCIIRIVER. 

Col. and Chief of Staff. 
Major-GeiKM-al PoRTER, 

(.'ommanding, &c., &e. 

Both of the preceding orders, as a reading of them will ^liow, as- 
sumed that the enem}' wei'c retreating. In fact, it seems that during all 
that momentous campaign Pope had l)ut two ideas, viz.: One, that the 
enemy were continually fall.ng back; — the other, that he oiiglit to be 
at Centreville, which is doubtless the place meant when he fixed his 
headquarters "somewhere on the Warreuton pike." 

From our elevated position on the high gi-ound we could distin- 
guish no movement on the part of the i-ebels indicating a retreat on 
their part; tmd Gen. Porter took a contrary view to that expi'esscd in 
the orders. 

He nevertheless set his troops in motion to "pKr.^'/e the enoivj.''' 

Now, allow mo to dcscril)e more particularly the situation at the time 
the aliove-stated movement was begun: 

Jackson's corps of the relx'l army occupied the line of the abandoned 
Independent railroad, his left resting in the vicinity of Sndley's Mill?, 
and his risrht to the north and west of Groveton. LonsTstreet was-niai'clv- 



20 

ing down to unite with him irom the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, 
his cohiiiin forming, wifn that of Jackson, an obtuse angle. Between 
Jackson antl Longstreet, however, wlien the battle of tlie 30th began, 
there was a small gap, thus leaving the right wing of tlie army of the 
former exposed to a tiaiik attack from the Union forces; but the rebel 
leader had foreseen his weakness and strengthened his position by mass- 
ing his artillery at the point of threatened danger. The Union forces 
were within the angle thus formed and to the south and east of it, their 
lines facing w'est and north. 

Jackson was endeavoring to push his way eastward far enough to 
enable him to intercept Pope's retreat on Washington, and Pope him- 
self was endeavoring to recover the position he had lost by bad gener- 
alship and once more reconstruct his lines between the enemy and the 
capital. At the time of which I am writing his right wing was nearly 
parallel with and south of Jackson's, thus bringing the latter nearly 
across his line of retreat. We — that is, Porter's corjjs — occupied the left 
of Pope's line, which was a little to the eastward of and part of it fac- 
ing Groveton. We of the 1st brigade had the Warrenton pike at our 
backs and the Independent railroad line in our front. 

]^[ow for a more particular description of the ground upon which the 
battle was fought: The high ground to the west of Groveton was held 
by the enemy, (the extreme right of Jackson,) thus commanding the 
Warrenton pike. The railway to which I have alluded runs in nearly 
an easterly and westerly direction, and, like all graded roads, presents 
sometimes an embankment — sometimes a cut. Imagine, if you can, a 
heavy piece of timber, out of which emerges an embankment or "till" 
of some twenty or thirty feet in height, flat on top, and which, running 
westward perhaps a hundred and twenty yards, terminates in a cut of 
from eight to ten feet deep and about the same width at the bottom, 
which cut continues on in the same direction, for about two lumdrcd 
yards and then tends slightly to the northward, debouching upon tho 
open elevated ground. IS''ow imagine yourself standing upon the south- 
ern edge of this cut, midway between the timber whence the embank- 
ment issues and the slight northward bend where the road-bod debouches 
on the open plain, and face the south. Upon your left you have woods 
crossing the railway at riglit angles and extending in a direct line for 
six hundred yards, forming one side of a parallelogram; in your front, 
running from east to west, another piece of timber, free from under- 
brush on the side nearest you, and say three or four hundred yards from 
left to riglit, forms the second side; and the railway line at your hack 
makes the third side. The remaining side, to the west, is open rolling 
country, except that where the line of the road makes the bend toward 
the north there is, on the southern side, and at right angles to it, a small 
ravine fringed with bushes and stmUed trees. From your feet, to- 
ward the south the ground falls slifirhtlv for five or six vards, and 
then drops away more rapidly till it forms an elevation or ridge, upon 
which you stand, of some lifty feet in height. From the foot of this 
declivity it stretches out into a level plain, crossing which you ascend 
a gentle, even slope to the timber which, as already observed, faces the 
cut. Now turn directly about, and you will perceive that on the oppo- 



21 

site side ol tlio road-bed the ground slopes gently upward until it has 
attained an elevation of three or four feet above that whereon jou stand, 
and then gradually and evenly falls away to heavy timber a couple of 
hundred yards distaui, thus forming u ridge parallel with the cut, and 
a commanding position overlooking the ground descril)ed as lying to 
the southward. Upon this i-idge, on the day of baUle, about thirty 
yards in rear of the cut, the rebel batteries were i)lanted. There were 
six guns— 12-pounders — at a point where the einbankiuent tern)inates in 
the open iield, six guns — howitzers — of the same calibre the same dis- 
tance in rear of the centre of the cut, (midway between the timber and 
the bond in the road,) and four guns just bovond the bend, but masked 
from troops approaching in front by the small ravine already mention- 
ed. Behind those guns lay the main body of Jackson's army, and the 
cut and embankment in front of them were occupied by a heavy force 
of his infantry. Behind the timber, in rear of this formidable position, 
was stationed, on elevated ground, the reniainder of the rebel artillery, 
which, when the Union forces advanced, shelled them over the heads 
of the Confederates. 

I have thus hastily sketched the position of the right wing of Jack- 
son, and will now briefly point out that of the left of our own line 
confronting him. In the strip of timber running parallel with and 
about six hundred yards distant from the abandoned railroad, lay the 
1st l)rigade, 1st division of the Fifth Corps, composed of the 18th Mas- 
sachusetts, on the left, extending westward to the open fields, the 13th 
New York, "• T-iochester regiment," next, then the 25th New Yoik. 2d 
Maine, 22d Massachusetts, and 1st Michigan, the latter extending into 
the timber running north up to the embankment by about one com- 
pany. This brigade mimbered about 1,500 men. Farther to the west, 
but deflecting toward the south so as to face in the direction of Jack- 
:son's extreme right and from whence Longstreot was expected, and 
partly crossing the Warrenton pike, stretched the other troops of the 
corps, some 4,500 men. 

I have been thus particular in describing the general situation in 
order that the movements following may be more clearly understood. 
Henceforth I will more especially follow the fortunes of my own regi- 
ment and brigade. 

As we lay waiting for tlie order to attack, we could look into the 
black-throated muzzles of the guns crowning the crest of the ridge 
l>efore us, except those of the four |)ieces screened from view by the 
ravine in our front and a little to our left. Just before us, along the 
edge of the timber, iurnishing us a temporary shelter, was a rail fence, 
"staked and ridered," about six feet high, and between it and us a 
wagon road. 

But I'will not dwell longer upon these details. The order came for 
us to advance. The 1st brigade was to open the conflict by storming 
the height. We left the tmiber and began climbing the fence. The 
rebel guns in sight opened upon us with grape and canister, while from 
beyond, the heavier batteries of the enemv sent a perfect tempest of 
shot and shell upon our devoted heads. We passed down the slope in 
splendid order, our ranks closed up and our alignment almost perfect 



22 

We lost men, it is true, but the gaps were filled. We kept our front, l)ut 
a shortened line evidenced our losses. We reached the level gi-ound, 
through the centre of which, parallel to our line, ran a ditch or dead- 
furrow. Across it we went, leaving many onthewa}'; — on, on we 
pressed to the foot of the declivity, and all the while the heavens rained 
death from bursting shell;— all the while the rebel skirmishers and 
sharpshooters poured into our i-anks the leaden hail. When w^e reached 
the level, the guns in our immediate front, no longer able to do us harm, 
ceased belching forth their deadly missiles, and as we began to climb the 
steep ascent we thought tlic day was oin's. Ilalf-way up, and onward 
with ci rush and hurruh we dashed. J3nt, alas! our hopes were short- 
lived. From our left, within a hundred yards of us, the guns hitherto 
kept concealed opened upon us. Enfilading our lines, their tire swept 
down scores at every discharge; yet we did not falter. I doubt if any 
man thought of going back. We gained the high ground on a level 
with the top of the cut; then we saw the rebel infantry, — the trap intf) 
whicli we liad fallen. For the first time during our charge our rifles 
rang their notes of death; — for the fii'st time since we stai'ted ii'om the 
wood we realized the fullness of our danger. 

The rebel infantry [)Oured in their volleys, and we were scarce a 
dozen feet from the nmzzles of their muskets. Oh, it w'as terrible! 
Down went Galpin, lieese, Kiehle, Stewart, Beniamin— all from my 
own comjtany of thirty men— killed; down went Buimell, Ilasler. 
Savage, Thomas, Jen-olds, Ilertendorf, and scores of brave men until 
a [teiiect windi'ow of dead and woimded marked where valor hafl come 
to stay; down went your humble servant an«l many more until the loth 
Gould count nearly half of its members lying beneath its flag. And 
the regiments to our rii2:ht and left fared no better. For twenlv min- 
utes the shattered rennunits of the 1st brigade held the slope swept by 
a hurricane of death, and each minute seemed twenty hours long. For 
twenty minutes the bullets hunnned like swarming bees, and the parch- 
ed lierbage was nourisbed by streams of gore from gallant hearts, 
while the accursed railroad cut began to fill with rebel dead and 
wounded; — for twenty minutes, and then those yet alive and able to do 
8o received orders to fall back. We who fell — the dead, the dying, 
and tlie disabled — held the field. 

I lav near where I fell, partly supported by a huge rock jutting from 
tlio side hill at my back, and beside me Cai)t. Savage, who died before 
the combat was fairly over. And I thought then, as I do now, that 
had Pope, instead of making such cowardly and indecent haste to get 
to Washington, where there was no dangei', supported Porter, we would 
have won the day. We would have crushed the right wing of Jack- 
son's corps, interposed ourselves between him and Longstreet, who 
came up just at the close of the engagement, and, with our numerical 
superiority, have beaten them in detail. Porter's troops opened up 
the way, but were not sustained. Why they were not, let Gen. Pope 
answer. 

After the retreat of the remnants of my brigade, (and how any of 
them escaped is a wonder to me.) I crawled up into the cut just at the 
bend, it being more sheltered from the fire of one of our batteries cov- 



o:-ing tlie rotreat, and had lain there but a few moments when Jackson 
rode up to with hi six feet of me. His troops were ah'eady following 
on after tlie Union forees, who were making a 8tul)l)orn stand in the 
timber wlienee they had issued at the commencement of tlie action. 

The rebels came, helped me up, and bore me back a short distance, 
where all our wounded, some 1,800 men, were gathered under guard, 
and there, until the 3d of September, I lay in agony, men dying almost 
hourly for want of care. On the 3d I started for Centreville to be 
]>aroIed, and ci'oirised the fated field. Our dead boys lay there as they 
fell, stark and gliastly ; and the tears c;nne to my eyes as I passed along 
the line and recognized one and another and bade them ffood-bv lor- 
ever more. 

That was long ago; but yet now, as I write, the old times conic back 
lo me in all their freshness, and through the long vista of eighteen 
years that fatal field rises up to view. 

In my mind's eye I see the cannon-crowned crest, the long waving 
lines of blue as the}' advance to the charge, the flags, the gleaming 
steel, the smoke of battle. I hear the roar of cannon, the bursting 
shell, the screaming grape, the rattling musketry, the shrill commands, 
the groans of agony, the cries of pain, and, sadder far, I seem to behold 
<>nce more the faces of comrades upturned to the blue sk}', I)nt into 
whose eves the filling sunshine slieds no golden lijirht. Ah! lanirua'rc! 
cannot describe my feelings as the past returns, l)ringing with it the 
terrible, bloody scenes of that fateful day. 

Out of my regiment of, as I now remember, 289 men, nearly it' not 
quite one-half were either killed or wounded. In my own company of 
30 men, as already stated, five were killed outright, one died shortly 
after from his wounds, and of the remainder scarcely half escaped 
without injury. And the history of my regiment was but that of every 
"thor in the command. Y"ou who were with me there can testify to 
the truth of my assertions. 

You gallant men of Maine, Th(^ old 2d; and you of Massachusetts, 
tlie 18th and 22d; and you of Michigan, the 1st; and you men of New 
York, the 13th and 25th, all of the 1st brigade, — what say you? Did 
Torter's troops tight that day? 

What answer have ^/oii to make, you men of Dui'yea's regiment, 
who followed the gallant Warren, and )/o>t of Pennsylvania, the lie- 
serves, whom Heynolds and Meade and Seymour and Jackson led, 
when I ask the question, — Did i/ou fight that day? And you heroes 
of the regular army, veterans of other fields and other watx, what say 
you ? Did )/oa fcght that day ? 

Ah, comrades! our losses that day give tlie answer, — 2,200 men 
killed and woundeil out of 6,000! More than one-third of Porter'.s 
command during that batlh^. left upon the field in testimony of the loy- 
alty, of all! 

And those who were then our enemies, they too testify to our disci- 
pline and courage — to the vigorous strokes we dealt them along the line 
of tlie abandoned railroad, and further on our left, where Buchaniiii and 
(/hapman and Warren held them at bay so bravely. \ud ycl — and 
yet, comrades, wo are told I>y Pope — we are told by others wlin uould 



24 

make false history — that on the 30th day of August, in tlie year of grace 
eighteen hundred and sixty-two, Portefs troops did notjigld, or that they 
made such a weak and feeble attack as to prove themselves of little 
worth in the battle fought ! 

Think of it, you men of the Fifth Corps! Think of it, you men of 
the Army of the Potomac! Tliink of it, brave soldiers every Vv'here ! 
Think, and then make answer! 

But allow me to repeat the language of Pope ^vhen referring to the 
part taken by General Porter and his troops in the action of the 30th. 

In his official report, written months alter the dreadful scenes I have 
but faintly described, he attempts to [)lant the cloven-foot of his own 
dishonor upon the graves of those of tbo Fifih Corps who died, and to 
cast the burden of his own shame not only upon their memory, but upon 
the name of every man who fought under l^orter that day. 

lie says: "The attack of Porter ims neit/ier vigorous nor persistent, and 
his troops soon retired in considerable confasiony 

And this is the calm and deliberate statement of General Porter's 
accuser ! 

Men of the Fifth Corps — comrades of the Army of the J^otomac — if 
there be one among all your thousands and tens of thousands having 
a knowledge of the facts who does not believe this statement of Pope 
to be a willful and deliberate lie, let him stand forth. 

Let him visit the graves of his comrades from Maine and from Mas- 
sachusetts, from New York, Pennsylvania, and from Michigan who 
perished at Groveton, and paint upon eacli headstone this inscription: 
" Here lies one who, if not a coward, was disloyal to the cause for ivhich hi: 
died. Let his memory remain only to be dishonored.''^ 

Let him who believes Pope's lying accusation inscribe upon ihe tat- 
tered and blood-stained remnants of our battle Hags, this: ^' These flags 
loere dishonored by the more tJian two thousand men of the Fifth Corps tcho 
fell at Groveton, August 30, 1862, while maldng a loeak and, feeble attack 
upon the eneiny." 

Or let him write upon the discharge-papers of those who were wounded 
and maimed there, this legend: " This man was wounded and made a 
cripple for life at Groveton., August 30, 1862, lohile making neither a vigor- 
ous nor persistent attack upon the foe. He charged., loith his brigade, threr 
times across an open field in the face of superior numbers and a m.urdcrous 
fire of artillery, and upon the fourth charge fell severely wounded, lohen 
he was loithin less than a dozen feet of the muzzles of the enemy'' s guns. Let 
him. be dishonored ! " 

Let it be whispered into the ears of the widows and orphans of the 
dead of Porter's corps, and into the ears of all the mourners who lost 
dear ones who fought under him that day: " Shame! Shame! upon the 
name you bear! Shame! Shame! upon him lohom you loved. The hero-idol 
of your hearts proved himself a coward and a traitor at Groveton. He was 
one of the ignoble two thousand out of six thousand men who fell in battle 
there — he loas one of the hundreds loho died — let his memory perish or live 
on and on through ihe bitter years, an object of contempt and loatldng to all 
man/cind." 

Comrades, do you like the picture which springs into being as you 



25 

read that " the attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent," and 
realize the fuUness of the meaning which the words convey? 

Are you ready, fellow-soldiers, for the time when it shall be consid- 
ered only a deep disgrace to have holougcd to the Fifth Corps, and 
more shameful yet to have served under General Porter? 

If you are not, then you must act. Tell General Pope, in language 
too plain to bo raisuuders*^ood, that you are proud of your old com- 
mander and of the organization to which you belonged. Say to the 
members of the packed and partisan tribunal, by courtesy styled a 
military court of justice, that the day has gone by when right can be 
controlled by partisan hate or malice. Say to them that Truth, the 
handmaiden of Justice, has proclaimed it broadcast over the land that 
Porter and his troops did figlit at Groveton vigorously and persistently, 
and that there is no longer excuse for them if they persist in upholding 
their unrighteous judgment, based, as it is, upon falsehood and party 
bias; — based, as it is, upon one man, and that one, General Pope. 

Ah, what must bo the heart of that man who, in face of the record 
as truth has written it — in the very presence of the noble dead who died 
that day under ihe command of Gen. Fltz John Porter, under the lus- 
tre and glory of our Hag — can stand up and say that the Fiftli Corps 
proved false to country, to honor, and to itself on that occasion ! 

If Porter did not tight, then were we cowards all, or traitors to the 
cause we all had sworn to serve. 

If Porter did not tight, then were we, his soldiers, recreant to the high 
trust our country imposed in us when she gave us the blue to wear and 
placed in our hands weapons to use in her defense! 

If Porter made a weak and feeble attack, then were we who hailed 
him as our chief false to the nation, to honor, and to ourselves! 

Comrades, we did light ! You of the grand old Army of the Potomac 
will believe us; for you know full woll the stuif of which our corps was 
made. 

You saw us on the Peninsula — you stood shoulder to shoulder with 
us during the "Seven Days" — you were with us at the last at Malvern. 
You know we never flinched; that we would no sooner yield than 
would you. Judge us by yourselves, and we can ask no more. 

It is hard for us who Ibught and suifered at Manassas — wdio gave our 
lind)s and poured out our blood like water there, to have it continually 
rung in our ears that we failed in duty. And if our leader failed, we 
failed. We were both one then in spirit, as I believe we are to-day. 
An aspersion cast upon his good name and fame is a stain upon those 
who served under him. To impeach his loyalty is to impeach the loy- 
alty of the Fifth Corps — of every one who then had the right to wear the 
cross of .Malta. 

Never has a man in this our land l)een so grievously wronged as 
Gen. Porter. 

Never has a man in this our land suffered injustice so patiently. 

It is hio-h time that justice be done him. It is time that the origina- 
tor of thecharges against him — his persecutor — be shown up in his true 
light for the execradon of every honest man. 



26 

And who was bis accuser — wlio has been his persecutor ? Oon. Jolm 
Pope. 

What order of man — what kind of a general is John Pope? I will 
endeavor to answer. Doubtless some who have taken the trouble to 
read the history of his campaign in Virginia will be inclined to the 
opinion that he is an ignoramus by right of birth and a fool I'roiri 
instinct. 

Those more charitably disposed, however, will possibly conclude that 
when he issued his "headquarters-in-thc-saddie" manifesto he some- 
how changed ends witli himself, relegating his mental faculties to the 
level of his seat. It matters not which view is accepted, if either; 
the fact of his utter incompetency and \vorthlessness remains, and will 
remain while the story of his career lives in history. 

His unlitness for command is shown by his own orders and the result 
of his campaign. It was not the fault of his subordinates, nor was it 
the fault of his men, that he failed. No better or braver soldiers than 
his ever carried musket or faced a foe in battle. Their honor was and 
is stainless. Their loyalty and gallantry was and is assured. He alone 
was to blame. Let him bear the burden. 

The idea of a commander, educated to the profession of arms, having 
two generals of division w-ith from 9,000 to 15,000 men — a small army — 
fioatmg around him within a radius of from live to eight miles and he 
unable to find them for half a day or more, and that, too, at a time 
when, according to his own admissions, he needed every available man 
that could be mustered ! 

But incompetency is not the only charge that can be sustained against 
Gen. Pope. He has no clear perception of truth in matters in whicli 
he is deeply interested. 

There is an obliquity in his mental vision which causes him to see 
things and events other than they reall}' are. 

He saw- the enemy in full retreat when there was no retreat save by 
himself. 

He saw Gen. Porter in a position wdiere Gen. Porter was not and 
could not have been without first having defeated Longstreet. 

He saw a battle where there was no battle, and where there was one 
of the most sanguinary conflicts recorded during all the war he saw 
no battle at all — only a weak and feeble attack — an attack in which 
ever}' third man of the 0,000 engaged was either killed or wounded. 

In regard to this same battle, and in order to, if possil)Ie, convince 
the people of Porter's alleged guilt, he placed the 2,000 and more men 
of the Fifth Corps who fell on the 30th of August to the credit of the 
engagement and losses on the 29th, and by such a despicable trick sought 
to rob us as well as our commander of whatever of honor we had earned. 

Gen. Pope saw a heinous oflense in Gen. Porter because of his saving. 
by his generalship, the Union army from utter overtlirow both on the 
29th and oOth days of August, but saw nothing to condemn in the two 
officers who fell back from Thoroughfare Gap without orders, and thu.s 
permitted Longstreet with his 25,000 meu to march through unmolested 
on the 28th. 

And it is doubtless to Gen. Pope's efforts more than for any olher 



27 

reai^oii that those two generals, who should tlieinselves have been eourt- 
martialed, were made a part of the eonrt which tried Gen. Porter; and 
tried hirn for what ? Why, because ho held Longstreet in ehedc on the 
•29th of August and prevented liim from adding his force to that of 
Jackson. Simply for doing exactly what liicketFs and King ha(J i)een 
ordered to do, and in the accomplishment of which they liad signully 
failed. Simply because he had shown himself a i)etter soldier than hi's 
suijcrior oiKcer. 

Willi regard to the composition of the court that tried Gen. Porter, 
r have little to say. It was partisan throughout j)olitically and to some 
extent pei'sonaljy. Two of its meml)ers, as I have already intimated, 
were themselves delicately situated, their couduct in withdrawing from 
Thoroughfare Gap having laid them open to censure. To shift the 
l)urden upon Gen. Porter would relieve their own shoulders. Is it 
strange, then, that Porter was convicted? 

(leu. Pope, Gen. Porter's real accuser, was even more deeply interested. 
With liim, blundering had been the rule and military i'oresight the excep- 
tion; and after tlx; teriiiinalion of the ('ami)aign he began to see, after 
his stuj)i(l lashiou. that s<)uiel)()dy would be blamed for his misconduct, 
lie looked around for a \ictiiii and saw the commander of the Fifth 
Corps. Porter was a democrat, and democrats were then considered 
lawlul game by all srood republicans, and it was resolved that lY)rter 
■should be "l)rought down." atul he was; — not in the opinion of his old 
companions in arms; not in the opinion of those who knew him well; 
not in the estimation of th" men lie had led to battle. He was •• biought 
down" only in the eyes of the faction who deposed hini from his high 
<;ommaiid and made him the victim fir another's guilt and blunders. 

Looking over the proceedings of his court-martial and reading the 
liistory o\' the events that caused the court to be held, it is dilHcult to 
arrive at but one conclusion: that the real (piestion at issue was not wlio 
is the guilty nian, but whose friends are strongest with the party in 
power. 

Pope held the winning hand. It is true he sacriticed his manhood 
to win success, and bartered his honor for the uniform of a major-gen- 
eral ; but lie succeeded. That fact satisfied him, for the time being at 
least. But he was not long to remain satisiied with that, the lirst victory 
lie had- ever won. When General I'orter sought a rehearing it was 
opposed by Pope. Honorable men and able statesmen, stalwart re[)ub- 
licans like the lamented Vice-President Wilson and Governor and Gen- 
eral Chamberlain ,of Maine, thought the connnander of the Fifth Corps 
ought to be reheard in his own defense; Pope thought otherwise, and 
so for fil'teen years the verdict stood. 

President Hayes — and all honor to him for the gracious act — took 
action in the matter to the end that Justice might be done. After a 
report based upon a long and patient investigation by the military board, 
consisting of Generals Schotield, Terry, and Getty, each of whom y()U 
all know or know of, the matter was referred to Congress. 

The military board fully acquitted General Porter, and Congress was 
called Ujion to decide u[ion the means for re[)aration. 

It was hoped by General Porter's friends that when the matter came 



up for consideration it might be discussed and acted upon in that spirit 
of fairness which should actuate all just-minded men. But such was 
not to be the case. Hardly had the President's reference been received 
when the political ball was set in motion and the drawing of a partisan 
line began. 

In politics, as in boiling brine, the scum rises to the surface, and 
hence the hre of debate brought Logan and Carpenter into view. 

These two individuals about equally distinguished themselves; the 
former, by artfully concealmg the truth; the latter, in his usual erratic 
manner, by distorting it. Both seemed to agree in one respect, viz.. 
that Porter would serve the i)urposc of a bugaboo to frighten the people 
into voting a thii'd term to General Grant. But the people proved not 
to be children, and the third-term project met a disastrous defeat in the 
home of the very Senator who delivered a campaign document four 
days long to aid the " boom." 

The remarkable efiusion of Mr. Logan holds up a truly pitiable spec- 
tacle TO public gaze. It shows a great government of a great nation 
pleading, like any petty thief or common criminal, the statute of limita- 
tions in bar of justice. If Logan is the mouth-piece of America, she says, 
substantially, that "Porter may be innocent, he may have suii'ered un- 
justly, but the time for redress has gone by. He must live on and suf- 
fer on under the unmerited burden of a deep disgrace, for there is no 
power upon the earth to relieve him of his load." And this shameful 
story, if it be true, is proclaimed abroad to the listening ears of foreign 
nations, who would not dare, despoiic as they may chance to be, to 
make such an admission to their own people and to the world. 

Great God! Is it true that here, in this land of freedom, if the gov- 
ernment througli its oiiicers and servants commits a wrong, there is no 
way of righting it? Is it true that here, if injustice is visited upon a 
citizen there is no remedy ? 

I am no military critic, nor am I a close student of the art and laws 
of war, but this I will say: All the tine-spun theories and arguments 
advanced against legislative action upon the case of General Porter arc 
the merest bosh. The will of the peo[)le is supreme, and if they, through 
their Senators and Representatives, decide to mete out justice or amend 
a wrong, the object aimed at may be easily and lawfully reached. 

But I do not believe that the sentiments expressed by Senator Logan. 
and by Carpenter, his henchman, are the sentiments of the American 
people. 

Nor do I believe them to be the sentiments of the res])ectable ele- 
ment of the republican party. Demagogues like the Senator from 
Illinois ma}^ preach them, but those who love truth and justice will 
pay little heed. The friends of Pope may scatter them broadcast, bui 
the baleful seed will find no lodgment in honest hearts. Our people 
are too jealous/)f their rights to permit any man or set of men to force 
upon them a theory that may some day put them in the same or a simi- 
lar position to that which Gen. Porter occupies at present. 

I say this not only as an American, and one who fought under Gen. 
Porter, but as a republican. 

At the age of twenty-one years, I voted for the first time, in 1864, 



29 

and voted for Mr. Lincoln; I voted for Gen. Grant; and, had I been 
possessed of u vote in the last canvass, should have voted for President 
Hayes. 

But although a republican, I nevertheless repudiate such .sentivncntb 
as are expressed in the. speeches of Senators Logan and Carpenter to 
which I have referi'cd. 

I re|;)udiate theu' a1 tempt to make political capital out of the matter. 

I believe in doing full justice to even a political antagonist, and regret 
to see any disposition on the part of rcpul)licans to make it appear that 
Gen. Torter's only hope for success rests in the sympathy his case may 
excite in the breasts of the " rebel brigadiers," as they are styled by 
some, in Congress. 

I thiidv that, inasmuch as the republican party is primarily responsible 
for the wrong done Gen. Porter, the republicans should be the first, or 
among the lirst, to undo tlmt \vrong. 

And I should exceedingly regret to have it become a matter of history 
that Ihe gi-eat republican party was less just to one whom it had injured 
deeply (ban wei'e those against whom that one had l)ravely fought upon 
many a bloody lield. I should very much dislike to have it said that 
Gen. Porter, after nearly eighteen years of suitbring, received at the 
hands of his former foes that justice w'hich was denied him by those in 
whose Ijchalf he fought. 

Such a record would be shameful to the republican pjarty — shameful 
to ever}" honest republican in the land. 

The case of Gen. Porter should be inquired into and disposed of, not 
with a view to beneliting this or that political j^arty, but simply for 
the purpose of doing equity. 

Tlie question of his restoration should be considered judicially by 
those who have to deal with it, and ought not, in any sense, to be made 
a party measure. 

If Gen. Porter has been wronged — and that he has, the truth now 
makes plain — ever}' honest man, without regard to party affiliation, 
should join with his friends to see him righted, and especially should the 
members of his former conmiand come to the front and sustain him 
now as vigorously and bravely as they were wont to do on the field of 
battle. So should his fellow-soldiei's of the Army of the Potomac. 

A united elfort on our part exerted in his behalf will accomplish 
much. We may assist greatly in restoring Justice to her proper throne 
in the hearts of those who make our laws and rule over us ; and this 
accomplished, the restoration of Gen. Porter to the Army and the 
wiping away of the stains so cruelly put upon his good name and fame 
are sure to follow. 

I ask you, then, rnen of the Fifth Corps, and T ask you of the Poto- 
U'ac Army who served in other corps, to assist in bringing about such 
a happy result. 

It is due to Gen. Porter; it is due to us, the survivors of his old com- 
mand ; it is due to the memory of our dead. 

I ask you, thei-efore, to arise in the majesty of your sti'ength and 
pluck down the hateful partisan idols worshiped in the past, signalizing 



30 

the event by crowning your brave deeds with one noble act which shall 
outlive and outsliine all otliei's in the years to come. 

Arise and say to Gen. Porter's accusers that a partisan spirit shall no 
longer be permitted to inflict a never-ending penalty upon an innc^eent 
raan, a brave soldier, and one ever found loyal and true! 

Say to them that the unholy sentence of nearly eighteen years ago 
must be revoked because justice requires it, and it is your will that 
justice be satisfied. Such an expression from you must have great 
weight, for the will of the Army of the Potomac cannot be lightly 
disi'egarded. 

Do but this much, and in the days yet to come your hearts will be 
cheered by the recollections of the part you had in restoring to the 
Army one of its In'ightest intellects and to tlie country one of her bravest 
and most loyal defenders, and to the Fifth Corps of the Arm}' of the 
Potomac and of the Union its honor and good name. 

Do this, and I for one shall ever remain your debtor. 

Firm in the belief that you will not remain silent, and with expression 
of my sincere regard for each and every one to whom this is addressed, 
I I'cmain, verv trulv. j'our friend and former companion in arms, 

JXO. 8. SLATER, 

13tli X. Y. v., 1st Bri^'., 1st Div., 5tli Corps, 

Array of the Potomac, 



For additional <\)pies, addreas 

JNO. S. SLATER, 

9 11 Sixth Street Northwest, 

WASHIXGTON, D. C. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



013 706 642 7 



LIBRARY OF CCHGRESS 

mm 

013 706 642 7 



